Construction Claim Rules in District of Columbia

Statutory interest rate

6% / year, fixed (general default); other rates apply in narrower contexts

The District's general default legal rate, used when a contract doesn't specify its own rate, is a fixed 6% per year. Judgments against the District of Columbia government itself are capped at 4% per year; a separate formula (70% of the IRS underpayment rate under 26 U.S.C. § 6621) applies to most other judgments once entered, subject to the court's discretion to lower it for good cause.

Compounding: Not specified in the statute text reviewed; treat as simple interest absent further confirmation.

Citation: D.C. Code § 28-3302

Source: https://law.justia.com/codes/district-of-columbia/title-28/chapter-33/section-28-3302/

This is a federal-district statute, not a state statute: D.C. Code § 28-3302 is enacted by the D.C. Council under home-rule authority, not by a state legislature. Three different rates apply depending on context (private contract default, judgments against the District government and general post-judgment interest); don't use one figure for all three.

Accrual: breach of contract claim

As of right on liquidated debts: from the date the debt was due and payable

D.C. Code § 15-108 governs liquidated debts, meaning an easily ascertainable sum certain; interest is owed as a matter of right from the time the debt was due and payable, at the contract rate if one applies, until paid. The D.C. Court of Appeals has confirmed that a good-faith dispute over the debt doesn't change its liquidated character or defeat this accrual date.

Citation: D.C. Code § 15-108; District of Columbia v. Pierce Assocs., 527 A.2d 306 (D.C. 1987)

Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/district-of-columbia/court-of-appeals/1987/86-375-4.html

This is federal-district case law (D.C. Court of Appeals, the District's local appellate court under congressional home-rule authority), not a state supreme court decision. Also confirm the interest rate itself against D.C. Code § 28-3302(a), since Pierce Associates held that rate caps apply regardless of which accrual section governs.

Accrual: property damage / tort claim

Discretionary: no fixed accrual date; courts may award interest from an earlier date only if needed to fully compensate

D.C. Code § 15-109 covers unliquidated damages, which includes most property-damage/tort claims. Under this section, a judgment bears interest from the date of judgment by default, but a court may include prejudgment interest running from an earlier date (such as the date of loss) as an element of damages, where necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff. There is no fixed statutory accrual date the way there is for a liquidated debt.

Citation: D.C. Code § 15-109; District of Columbia v. Pierce Assocs., 527 A.2d 306 (D.C. 1987)

Source: https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/15-109

This is federal-district statute and case law, not state law; D.C. Code Title 15 is enacted by the D.C. Council under congressional home-rule authority. Because this accrual date is discretionary rather than fixed, confirm how a specific judge is likely to treat the claim before assuming date-of-loss interest will be awarded.

Actual Cash Value rule

Undecided: DC has not adopted the Broad Evidence Rule or a fixed ACV formula.

A legal industry survey on total-loss valuation confirms that the District of Columbia (along with West Virginia) remains undecided on whether it follows the Broad Evidence Rule for ACV, unlike neighboring Maryland and Virginia, which have both adopted it.

Source: https://www.carrmaloney.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2-8-Total-Loss-Damage.pdf

RESEARCHED and confirmed via a legal-industry survey specifically addressing this question -- DC genuinely has no settled ACV valuation rule, independently corroborating the earlier 'None found' assessment.

ACV statute or regulation

The DC Department of Insurance, Securities and Banking has issued a bulletin, dated August 11, 2025, taking the position that depreciating labor in an ACV calculation is an unfair claims settlement practice under existing DC insurance law, though this is subregulatory guidance rather than a standalone statute.

DISB Bulletin 25-IB-001-08/12, dated August 11, 2025, states that labor, unlike physical materials, does not lose value or break down over time, and that depreciating labor costs when settling an ACV claim constitutes an unfair claims settlement practice. The bulletin cites D.C. Code Section 31-2231.17(b)(6), the District's existing unfair claims settlement practices statute, as its statutory basis, and states DISB will not approve policy forms that allow depreciation of labor or other nontangible items such as taxes, fees, overhead and profit. Because a bulletin is agency interpretive guidance applying an existing general unfair-claims-practices statute rather than a new statute or codified regulation specific to ACV methodology, this should be treated as the Department's current enforcement position rather than as a freestanding statutory rule.

Citation: D.C. Code Section 31-2231.17(b)(6); DISB Bulletin 25-IB-001-08/12 (Aug. 11, 2025)

Source: https://disb.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/disb/page_content/attachments/BULLETIN25-IB-001-0812.pdf

Recoverable depreciation holdback

No D.C. statute sets a holdback release deadline. On the related labor-depreciation question, D.C. regulators consider depreciating labor and other nontangible costs an unfair claims settlement practice.

No District of Columbia statute specifically governing the timing or process for paying withheld recoverable depreciation was found. On the related scope question, the D.C. Department of Insurance, Securities, and Banking issued a bulletin stating that depreciating labor and other nontangible items (including taxes, fees, and overhead and profit) in the ACV definition is considered an unfair claims settlement practice.

Citation: D.C. Dept. of Insurance, Securities, and Banking Bulletin 25-IB-001-08/12.

Source: https://www.hkr.law/survey-of-state-law-regarding-depreciation-of-labor-costs-in-determination-of-actual-cash-value/

RESEARCHED from scratch. No holdback-timing statute found; the labor-depreciation bulletin is from a comprehensive, dated (Aug. 2025) 50-state survey, not independently re-verified against the primary bulletin in this pass.

“No damages for delay” clause enforceability

Enforceable but with recognized exceptions, including active interference

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held no-damages-for-delay clauses generally enforceable, except where the delay was not contemplated by the parties, amounts to an abandonment of the contract, was caused by the other party's bad faith, or amounts to active interference. In the leading case, a contractor's inadequate work sequencing and failure to properly supervise a subcontractor was found to be actionable active interference, defeating the clause in that instance.

Citation: Blake Constr. Co. v. C.J. Coakley Co., 431 A.2d 569, 578-79 (D.C. 1981)

Source: https://rc.com/practices/Litigation/ConstructionLitigation/construction-litigation.cfm

This is a federal-district appellate decision (D.C. Court of Appeals), not a state supreme court ruling. A free, directly-linkable full-text copy of this specific case wasn't located this pass; confirm the quoted exceptions against the opinion itself before relying on them in a filing.

Construction contract filing deadline

3 years for a simple contract claim, express or implied

The District's general limitations statute sets a 3-year period for an action on a simple contract, whether express or implied, running from when the right to maintain the action first accrues.

Citation: D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(7)

Source: https://law.justia.com/codes/district-of-columbia/2021/title-12/chapter-3/section-12-301/

This is a federal-district statute enacted under congressional home-rule authority, not a state statute. Confirm the current subsection lettering directly with the D.C. Code before relying on it, since this section has been renumbered before.

State unemployment insurance (SUTA)

New-employer rate 2.7%, wage base $9,000, unchanged for 2026

The District of Columbia's unemployment tax rates are unchanged for 2026: the new-employer rate remains 2.7%, applied to the first $9,000 in wages per employee. Experience-rated positive-rated employers range from 1.9% to 4.4%, while negative-rated employers range from 6.2% to 7.4%; employers are also subject to a 0.2% administrative assessment on top of these rates.

Citation: DC Department of Employment Services (DOES), Unemployment Insurance Tax (2026)

Source: https://does.dc.gov/service/employer-tax-information-unemployment-insurance

Last checked: 2026-08-26

Confirmed accurate (2.7% new-employer rate, $9,000 wage base) against two independent 2026-dated sources.

Workers' compensation rating

NCCI advisory rates and class codes apply

The District of Columbia is an NCCI jurisdiction. Private insurers writing workers' compensation coverage in DC use NCCI's advisory loss costs and standard classification codes, filed with and regulated by the DC Department of Insurance, Securities and Banking. There is no exclusive fund; employers buy coverage on the private market.

Citation: NCCI State Advisory Forum, District of Columbia

Source: https://www.ncci.com/Articles/Pages/II_StateAdvisoryForumState_DC.aspx?state=District+of+Columbia

Prevailing wage law

Living Wage Act layered on federal Davis-Bacon coverage

The District of Columbia does not operate a separate construction-specific 'little Davis-Bacon' wage-determination system the way a state legislature would; because DC public buildings and public works already fall within the federal Davis-Bacon Act's own reach (applicable to contracts over $2,000 for construction of public buildings and public works), federal Davis-Bacon rates effectively apply on DC government construction contracts. Separately, DC's own Living Wage Act of 2006, D.C. Code Sections 2-220.01 through 2-220.11, requires a minimum living wage (higher than DC's minimum wage) on District government contracts and subsidies generally exceeding $100,000, though it functions more like a wage floor than a full occupation-by-occupation prevailing wage schedule.

Citation: D.C. Code Sections 2-220.01 to 2-220.11 (Living Wage Act of 2006); federal Davis-Bacon Act as applied to DC contracts

Source: https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/prevailing-wages

DC's construction wage-floor framework is a hybrid of federal Davis-Bacon coverage and the District's own Living Wage Act rather than a single standalone 'little Davis-Bacon' statute; a dedicated DC construction prevailing-wage determination page was not located this pass and this characterization should be reviewed by someone familiar with DC procurement law before being presented as definitive.

OSHA plan

Federal OSHA, no state plan (DC is a federal district, not a state, and is not eligible for an OSHA State Plan).

The District of Columbia is a federal district, not a state, so it cannot establish its own OSHA-approved State Plan the way a state legislature could. Both public and private employers in DC fall under direct federal OSHA jurisdiction.

Citation: 29 U.S.C. § 667 (State Plan eligibility limited to states); confirmed directly against OSHA.gov's official State Plans directory, which lists Washington, D.C. as federal-OSHA jurisdiction with no approved State Plan.

Source: https://www.osha.gov/stateplans

Weight of an OSHA violation in a negligence case

DC has strong, real, directly on-point precedent from an actual construction-site accident case: OSHA violations are not negligence per se, but ARE admissible as evidence of the standard of care, including for plaintiffs (like visitors or non-employees) not directly protected by OSHA.

Thoma v. Kettler Bros., Inc., 632 A.2d 725 (D.C. 1993): a jury verdict case arising from an actual construction site accident (a visitor injured while touring a house under construction). The court held OSHA regulations "of nationwide scope which did not give rise to negligence per se were nevertheless admissible as evidence of the standard of care," and specifically that a plaintiff who is not an intended beneficiary of the OSHA regulation (i.e., not an employee) may still use it as evidence of the standard of care. Confirmed independently through at least four other citing cases and sources (Clark v. District of Columbia (1997); Brown v. 1301 Street Ltd. P'ship; Orduna v. Total Construction Services (Neb. 2006), which cites Thoma directly on this point). Garcia v. GGI Glass Distribution Corp., No. 1:22-cv-00632 (D.D.C.), a real, currently active construction-injury case (defendants include Rand Construction Corp.), also exists and was confirmed via its actual docket (Judge Timothy J. Kelly issued an order on motions in limine on 9/19/2024, matching the date cited), though the full substantive text of that specific ruling on OSHA evidentiary weight was not independently read this pass.

Citation: Thoma v. Kettler Bros., Inc., 632 A.2d 725 (D.C. 1993); Garcia v. GGI Glass Distribution Corp., No. 1:22-cv-00632 (D.D.C.) (docket/date confirmed, full substantive holding not independently read).

Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/district-of-columbia/court-of-appeals/1993/92-cv-225-5.html

Third-party contribution against the employer

No statutory-employer shield described; third-party claims use ordinary negligence, premises liability, retained control, negligent undertaking, products, and vehicle law.

The District has no New York-style Scaffold Law and generally applies contributory negligence; D.C. Code §12-309 imposes special notice requirements for claims against the District itself.

Citation: D.C. Code Section32-1501 et seq.; Levy v. Schnabel Foundation Co., 584 A.2d 1251 (D.C. 1991).

Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/district-of-columbia/court-of-appeals/1991/89-1002-4.html

Source: attorney research manual (Construction Injury Law national volumes), self-marked "Draft; verify current law and citator status." Case citations are representative authorities from that manual, not independently re-verified against a citator by ClaimDuke. Citation corrected (584 A.2d 1251, not 1250). Confirmed real and directly on point (a construction excavation/shoring subcontractor case, adjacent-property damage during a D.C. building project).

Injury-severity gate on contribution claims

Narrow intentional-harm exception (specific intent to harm required, not mere recklessness), plus an uninsured-employer exception.

D.C. Code Section32-1503 bars ordinary negligence claims against the employer. Courts recognize an exception where the employer acted with specific intent to harm the employee -- ordinary negligence or even reckless disregard for safety does not qualify. Separately, an employer that fails to carry the legally required workers' comp insurance loses exclusivity protection.

Citation: D.C. Code Section32-1503.

Source: https://www.simeonemiller.com/blog/can-i-sue-my-employer-for-a-workplace-injury/

RESEARCHED (not just linked): the prior entry honestly flagged the exception mechanism as unknown. Confirmed the intentional-harm exception requires specific intent, a stricter standard than the 'substantial certainty' test used in some other jurisdictions.

Distinctive state doctrine

"First insured contractor" statutory-employer rule, now confirmed with the exact code section, plus no public guaranty fund backstop for uninsured employers

D.C. Code § 32-1503(c) confirms: the employer who subcontracts with another is liable for compensation to employees of the subcontractor unless the subcontractor secures payment; meaning an employee whose direct employer is an uninsured subcontractor can assert a claim against the general contractor, and where there is a hierarchy of contractors, the first insured contractor in that hierarchy becomes liable for compensation benefits. This is a distinctive 'first insured, not first GC' formulation, different from the 'regular business' or 'regular trade' tests used in most states in this dataset. If a D.C. employer fails to carry required workers' comp coverage, the injured employee may elect to sue in tort instead, and the employer loses the defenses of negligence of a fellow servant, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence in that suit. Unlike some states, D.C. has no public guaranty fund to fall back on if an uninsured employer simply cannot pay a resulting judgment. Intentional acts and sexual harassment are both confirmed exceptions to exclusivity.

Citation: D.C. Code § 32-1503(c); 7 DCMR § 201.4

Source: https://www.washlaw.org/workers-rights-manual/workers-compensation/