Construction Claim Rules in Georgia

Statutory interest rate

Prime rate + 3% (judgments); 7% (prejudgment default)

Postjudgment: Federal Reserve prime rate (as of judgment date) plus 3%, unless the contract specifies its own rate, which controls instead. As of August 20, 2026, the Fed's Bank Prime Loan rate (H.15 release) was 6.75%, putting the current effective postjudgment rate at approximately 9.75% for judgments entered around this date; the rate resets with the prime rate in effect on each judgment's date, so it will differ for judgments entered at other times. Prejudgment on a liquidated demand/open account: 7% simple by default if no contract rate.

Compounding: Not confirmed (statute doesn't state compounding)

Citation: O.C.G.A. §§ 7-4-12, 7-4-2

Source: https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-7/chapter-4/article-1/section-7-4-12/

Last checked: 2026-08-23

Verified against the Federal Reserve's H.15 Selected Interest Rates release: Bank Prime Loan rate was 6.75% as of August 20, 2026. Both O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12 (prime + 3% postjudgment, contract rate controls if specified) and O.C.G.A. § 7-4-2 (7% simple prejudgment default absent a written contract rate) were checked against current statute text via Justia and match the existing site data.

Accrual: breach of contract claim

From when the party became liable and bound to pay, generally the breach/due date

O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 provides that interest runs on a liquidated demand from the time the party became liable and bound to pay it, which for a construction contract debt is generally the date payment was due or the date of breach.

Citation: O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15

Source: https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-7/chapter-4/article-1/section-7-4-15/

Accrual: property damage / tort claim

Not date of loss: requires a specific written demand, then runs from 30 days after that demand if unpaid

Georgia's Unliquidated Damages Interest Act (O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14) lets a tort/property-damage claimant recover interest, but only after sending the defendant (or its insurer) a written demand meeting the statute's specific requirements. If the demand isn't paid within 30 days, interest runs from that 30-day mark, not from the date of loss itself. Skipping the demand step forfeits this interest right entirely.

Citation: O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14

Source: https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-51/chapter-12/article-1/section-51-12-14/

The demand's timing, content and delivery method are all statutory requirements; a demand that misses any of them can forfeit the interest right. Confirm the current procedural requirements before relying on this.

Actual Cash Value rule

Relaxed evidentiary standard for household/personal property (narrower than a full broad-evidence doctrine)

Purchase price/replacement cost plus approximate age is sufficient evidence for a jury to find ACV; established specifically for fire-damaged personal property, not confirmed as the controlling rule for structures/real property or general construction disputes.

Citation: Braner v. Southern Trust Ins. Co., 255 Ga. 117 (1985)

Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/1985/42284-1.html

This case is about household property destroyed by fire; may not control for a building/structure or a general construction claim. Needs a closer legal check before relying on it broadly.

ACV statute or regulation

No statute or regulation found that defines ACV or restricts labor depreciation.

No Georgia insurance-code statute or Department of Insurance regulation was found that defines how ACV must be calculated for a property claim or that restricts depreciating labor. Georgia Code 33-32-5 is a valued-policy statute governing total losses to one and two family dwellings by fire and only touches depreciation in the narrow context of coverage occurring between policy inception and loss, it does not set an ACV computation method. Georgia's ACV standard otherwise comes from case law applying a fair-market-value approach, which is the pre-existing common-law layer, not a newer statute.

Citation: O.C.G.A. 33-32-5 (reviewed and found not on point); Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 120-2-52 (reviewed, no ACV or labor depreciation provision found)

Source: https://rules.sos.ga.gov/gac/120-2-52

Searched the Georgia insurance code (Title 33) and the Department of Insurance's first-party claims settlement regulation (Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 120-2-52); neither contains an ACV-definition or labor-depreciation provision. Absence of a hit is not conclusive proof none exists, but no such statute or rule surfaced in DOI or legislative sources. CONFIRMED: Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 120-2-52 exists and is real, but is a first-party vehicle claim SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE regulation (timelines, replacement vehicle requirements), not an ACV computation/depreciation formula. No Georgia statute defines how ACV or depreciation is calculated; valuation is governed by case law/the Broad Evidence Rule.

Recoverable depreciation holdback

No Georgia statute specifically governing the timing or process for paying withheld recoverable depreciation was found.

Georgia Code Title 33, Chapter 32 (property insurance) and Section33-32-5 (valued-policy provisions for total fire losses) address related valuation topics, but no provision specifically sets a deadline or procedure for releasing recoverable depreciation once repairs on a partial loss are complete. This appears to be governed by individual policy terms rather than statute.

Source: https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/2020/title-33/chapter-32/

RESEARCHED from scratch (prior entry was blank). Same pattern as New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania: no state-specific holdback-timing statute found.

“No damages for delay” clause enforceability

Enforceable only if the clause is clear, unambiguous and specific; a bare 'extension of time' clause won't bar damages

Georgia courts require an exculpatory no-damages-for-delay clause to be clear, unambiguous and specific to bar recovery, construing any ambiguity against the drafter. In a case where a subcontract's clause only granted an extension of time for delay, the court held it didn't eliminate the right to recover monetary damages at all, since the parties had shown elsewhere in the same subcontract that they knew how to draft clearer delay-liability language when they intended it.

Citation: Ragan Enterprises, Inc. v. L&B Construction Co., 222 Ga. App. 335 (1996)

Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/court-of-appeals/1996/a96a0566.html

Construction contract filing deadline

6 years for an action on a simple written contract

Georgia's limitations period for actions on simple written contracts is 6 years from when the amount became due and payable, covering an ordinary written construction-contract claim.

Citation: O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24

Source: https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-9/chapter-3/article-2/section-9-3-24/

State unemployment insurance (SUTA)

Georgia's new-employer unemployment tax rate is 2.7% of the first $9,500 in wages per employee; experienced employers range from 0.04% to 8.1%.

New employers pay a flat 2.7% rate until they accrue enough experience to be individually rated. Established employers are then rated on a reserve-ratio basis, with published rates ranging from about 0.04% up to 8.1% depending on claims history. The taxable wage base is $9,500 per employee per year.

Citation: Georgia Department of Labor (GDOL).

Source: https://dol.georgia.gov/blog-post/2025-12-23/2026-employer-tax-rates-available-now

Last checked: 2026-08-26

Confirmed via three independent, consistent secondary payroll sources rather than a direct GDOL rate table (GDOL's 2026 rate notices are distributed through its Employer Portal to individual accounts, not published as a public table); confidence is good but slightly lower than the states checked directly against a public official rate document this round.

Workers' compensation rating

Georgia uses NCCI advisory rates rather than its own rating bureau.

Georgia relies on NCCI to develop workers' compensation loss costs and classification codes, which are then filed with the Georgia Office of Commissioner of Insurance and Safety Fire for approval. Claims administration and dispute resolution run through the Georgia State Board of Workers' Compensation, but rate-setting itself follows the standard NCCI advisory model used across most states.

Citation: NCCI Georgia State Advisory Forum, Georgia State Board of Workers' Compensation

Source: https://www.ncci.com/Articles/Documents/II_StateAdvisoryForumState_GA_2025.pdf

Prevailing wage law

Georgia has no state prevailing-wage law for public construction contracts.

Georgia is among the states that have never enacted a Little Davis-Bacon statute, or that repealed one so long ago that no current record of it was located this pass. Public construction let by Georgia state or local agencies is not subject to a state-mandated prevailing wage, only the federal Davis-Bacon Act applies, and only on federally funded work.

Citation: U.S. Department of Labor state prevailing wage summary

Source: https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/prevailing-wages

A specific repeal date or statute citation for Georgia was not located this pass; the state simply does not appear on DOL's list of states with an active prevailing wage law.

OSHA plan

Federal OSHA (no state plan)

Georgia has no OSHA-approved state plan; both public and private employers fall under federal OSHA jurisdiction.

Citation: 29 U.S.C. § 667 (State Plan roster)

Source: https://www.osha.gov/stateplans

Weight of an OSHA violation in a negligence case

Evidence of legal duty under OCGA § 51-1-6 when the plaintiff is the OSHA-violating defendant's OWN employee, but excludable as 'not pertinent' when the plaintiff is a different party's employee: a real trap for the exact multi-employer construction scenario this category covers.

Dupree v. Keller Industries, 199 Ga. App. 138, 141, 404 S.E.2d 291 (1991), is Georgia's leading case: OSHA regulations are admissible not merely as standards of performance but as evidence of legal duty, violation of which may give a cause of action under OCGA § 51-1-6. But that duty runs specifically between an employer and its own employees. In Brantley v. Custom Sprinkler Systems, Inc., 218 Ga. App. 431, 461 S.E.2d 592 (1995), a city employee sued a contractor hired by the city; evidence of the contractor's OSHA violation was held not pertinent, because the plaintiff was not that contractor's employee. In Smith v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 703 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010), OSHA stair-construction standards (29 C.F.R. § 1910.24(f)) were held admissible as evidence of legal duty for the plaintiff's own employer, and the trial court's refusal to charge the jury on those standards was reversible error. The distinguishing fact across all three cases is the employment relationship between the plaintiff and the OSHA-violating defendant, not a genuine doctrinal conflict. The practical construction-industry consequence: on a multi-employer job site, an injured worker suing a party other than their own direct employer for that other party's OSHA violation (a sub's employee suing the GC, or one sub's employee suing a different sub) may find that OSHA evidence gets excluded as 'not pertinent' under Brantley's reasoning, even though the same evidence would be squarely admissible under Dupree and Smith if the injured worker were suing their own employer.

Citation: Dupree v. Keller Industries, 199 Ga. App. 138, 404 S.E.2d 291 (1991); Brantley v. Custom Sprinkler Systems, Inc., 218 Ga. App. 431, 461 S.E.2d 592 (1995); Smith v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 703 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); OCGA § 51-1-6.

Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ga-court-of-appeals/1542528.html

Third-party contribution against the employer

A statutory employer that pays workers-comp benefits cannot be sued for contribution or implied indemnity by a third-party tortfeasor -- confirmed real and on point.

O.C.G.A. Section34-9-11 grants employer/statutory-employer tort immunity. Georgia courts have held that once a contractor is determined to be a statutory employer, it cannot be treated as a joint tortfeasor subject to contribution (Modlin v. Swift Textiles, Inc., 180 Ga. App. 726 (1986)), and a passive tortfeasor may not bring a claim for implied indemnity against an employer paying workers-comp benefits even where the employer's active negligence was primarily responsible for the injury (Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Joseph Campbell Co., 261 Ga. 822 (1992)). Contractual indemnity provisions, however, remain enforceable notwithstanding exclusivity.

Citation: O.C.G.A. Section34-9-11; Modlin v. Swift Textiles, Inc., 180 Ga. App. 726, 350 S.E.2d 273 (1986); Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Joseph Campbell Co., 261 Ga. 822, 411 S.E.2d 871 (1992).

Source: https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/2020/title-34/chapter-9/article-1/section-34-9-11/

CORRECTED: the prior citation (Groover v. Johnson, 251 Ga. App. 689 (2001)) was wrong-topic -- the actual case matching that party name, Groover v. Johnson Controls World Service (241 Ga. App. 791 (2000)), concerns average-weekly-wage calculation, unrelated to third-party contribution. Replaced with the real, confirmed, on-point authority.

Injury-severity gate on contribution claims

Georgia is one of only about 8 states that has NO intentional-act (or any) exception to workers-comp exclusivity -- confirmed real and current.

Georgia generally rejects the intentional-tort exception recognized by roughly 42 other states. To escape exclusivity an employee must show the employer had a SPECIFIC INTENT to cause injury -- merely showing an unsafe workplace, known dangerous conditions, or an OSHA violation is not enough, and this standard is met so rarely that Georgia is commonly listed among the small group of states (with Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Rhode Island, and possibly Idaho) that effectively provide no working exception. Georgia also rejects the dual-capacity doctrine. The exclusivity bar does not apply if the employer failed to carry required workers-comp coverage.

Citation: O.C.G.A. Section34-9-11.

Source: https://www.workerscompensation.com/daily-headlines/exclusive-remedy-in-georgia/

CORRECTED: the prior citation (Groover v. Johnson, 251 Ga. App. 689 (2001)) was drawn from a secondary attorney-research manual without independent confirmation and could not be verified as on point. Replaced with a confirmed, current, and more useful finding: Georgia is one of a small handful of states with essentially no working piercing exception at all -- independently confirmed via a specialty legal-industry 50-state survey (Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer) that lists Georgia, Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Rhode Island, and possibly Idaho as the states without an intentional-act exception.

Distinctive state doctrine

Design-professional immunity carve-out (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11)

Georgia extends the same third-party immunity that protects employers to construction design professionals (architects and engineers) retained to perform professional services on a construction project: unless the design professional specifically assumes the project's safety practices by written contract. This is broader than most states' treatment of design professionals, who are more commonly ordinary third-party defendants.

Citation: O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11

Source: https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/2020/title-34/chapter-9/article-1/section-34-9-11/