OSHA enforcement structure, how much weight an OSHA violation carries in a negligence case, and whether an injured worker's own employer can be pulled back in.
OSHA plan
Federal OSHA: no state plan; monopolistic state workers' comp fund
Ohio has no OSHA-approved state plan for private employers; both public and private employers fall under federal OSHA jurisdiction for safety enforcement. Separately (not an OSHA point, but relevant context), Ohio runs a monopolistic workers' comp system: private insurers cannot write workers' comp coverage in Ohio; employers buy through the state Bureau of Workers' Compensation (BWC) or qualify to self-insure.
Citation: 29 U.S.C. § 667 (State Plan roster); Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation enabling statutes
Source: https://www.osha.gov/stateplans
Weight of an OSHA violation in a negligence case
Correction to earlier research: Sikora's specificity test actually points toward negligence per se for specific OSHA standards, not away from it; no case naming OSHA directly was found, but the applicable framework is now confirmed accurately
Earlier research for this entry stated Sikora v. Wenzel held a building-code violation was NOT negligence per se because it was an administrative regulation. That was a misreading of the case and is corrected here: the Ohio Supreme Court in Sikora actually held that a violation of R.C. 5321.04(A)(1) (requiring landlord compliance with the Ohio Basic Building Code) DOES constitute negligence per se; subject to a notice-based excuse (a landlord isn't liable if they neither knew nor should have known of the defect). The Ohio Supreme Court has consistently held that whether a statutory or regulatory violation counts as mere evidence of negligence or as negligence per se depends on the degree of specificity with which the duty is stated: a general, abstract description of a duty requires the plaintiff to still prove every element of negligence, but where the rule sets forth 'a positive and definite standard of care... whereby a jury may determine whether there has been a violation thereof by finding a single issue of fact,' a violation is negligence per se; meaning the defendant is conclusively deemed to have breached the duty owed, though the plaintiff must still separately prove proximate cause and damages. Many OSHA construction standards (specific guardrail heights, specific fall-protection trigger heights, specific trench-shoring requirements) are exactly the kind of definite, bright-line rules this test points toward treating as negligence per se in Ohio; but no Ohio case was found this pass that expressly applies the Sikora framework to an OSHA regulation by name, so this remains an informed inference from the controlling test rather than a directly confirmed holding. A real, confirmed Ohio Supreme Court case supplies the actual holding: Hernandez v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 1215 (Ohio 1995), holds an OSHA violation does not constitute negligence per se, though it remains usable as evidence. Confirmed via a federal district court (S.D. Ohio) directly citing and applying it in an OSHA-negligence dispute.
Citation: Sikora v. Wenzel, 88 Ohio St.3d 493, 2000-Ohio-406 (2000) Hernandez v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 1215 (Ohio 1995).
Source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ohsd-1_08-cv-00116/pdf/USCOURTS-ohsd-1_08-cv-00116-0.pdf
Still needs a case expressly applying the Sikora specificity test to a named OSHA regulation before this can move from an informed inference to a directly confirmed classification.
Third-party contribution against the employer
Statutory employer is a live issue to check in Ohio, but the source doesn't detail the test.
Third-party claims otherwise turn on premises liability, active participation, retained control, and equipment defects: separate from the direct employer-intentional-tort claim under R.C. §2745.01.
Citation: Ohio Rev. Code §4123.74; Sopkovich v. Ohio Edison Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 628 (1998).
Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/oh-court-of-appeals/1133752.html
Source: attorney research manual (Construction Injury Law national volumes), self-marked "Draft; verify current law and citator status." Case citations are representative authorities from that manual, not independently re-verified against a citator by ClaimDuke.
Injury-severity gate on contribution claims
Exclusivity can be pierced through Ohio's statutory employer-intentional-tort claim.
Ohio Rev. Code §4123.74 generally protects the employer; §2745.01 governs the employer-intentional-tort claim that pierces that protection.
Citation: Ohio Rev. Code §4123.74, §2745.01; Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066 (2010).
Source: https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-ohio-1027.pdf
Source: attorney research manual (Construction Injury Law national volumes), self-marked "Draft; verify current law and citator status." Case citations are representative authorities from that manual, not independently re-verified against a citator by ClaimDuke. Pin citation corrected (125 Ohio St.3d 250, not 102). Confirmed real and directly on point (upheld the constitutionality of Ohio's employer intentional-tort statute, R.C. 2745.01).
Distinctive state doctrine
Ohio has a dedicated statutory employer-intentional-tort cause of action (R.C. §2745.01), rather than a purely judge-made intentional-tort exception like most states with one.
The statute itself defines the standard for piercing exclusivity via intentional tort, which Ohio courts (Kaminski) have applied: a codified approach that's more the exception than the rule among the intentional-tort states in this source.
Citation: Ohio Rev. Code Section2745.01; Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027 (2010).
Source: https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-ohio-1027.pdf
CORRECTED pincite: the case is real and directly on point (upholding Ohio's employer-intentional-tort statute, requiring specific intent to injure), but the volume/page cited was slightly wrong (125 Ohio St.3d 102 does not exist; the correct reporter citation is 125 Ohio St.3d 250). Confirmed via multiple independent citing sources including the Ohio Supreme Court's own docket.