Construction Claim Rules in South Carolina

Statutory interest rate

8.75% / year (pre-judgment, fixed); 10.75%/year compounded annually (post-judgment, floats, effective Jan. 15, 2026 through Jan. 14, 2027)

A flat 8.75%/year 'legal rate' applies to unpaid contract/construction debt before judgment, per S.C. Code Ann. § 34-31-20(A). Once judgment is entered, a floating rate applies instead: the prime rate as listed in the first January edition of the Wall Street Journal for that calendar year, plus 4 percentage points, compounded annually, confirmed each year by SC Supreme Court order no later than January 15, per § 34-31-20(B). For 2026 that works out to 10.75%.

Compounding: Simple pre-judgment; compounded annually post-judgment

Citation: S.C. Code Ann. § 34-31-20

Source: https://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t34c031.php

Last checked: 2026-08-23

sccourts.org still could not be reached directly this pass: its robots.txt blocks every path tried (site root, court-order archive, and PDF), and a Wayback Machine lookup was also blocked. The 10.75% post-judgment figure for 2026 is confirmed by a secondary source (a law firm's 2026 legal-rate post citing SC Supreme Court order 2026-01-07-01 and the correct statutory formula) rather than a direct fetch of the order text, so this remains secondary-sourced pending a working primary link. The 8.75% pre-judgment rate and the statutory formula language were separately confirmed against Justia's republished text of § 34-31-20, and the statute itself was confirmed live at scstatehouse.gov.

Accrual: breach of contract claim

From when the claim arose, if the measure of recovery was fixed by conditions existing at that time

South Carolina allows prejudgment interest on an obligation to pay money when the sum is certain, or capable of being reduced to certainty, if payment is also demandable by contract or by operation of law. The proper test is whether the measure of recovery was fixed by conditions existing when the claim arose, not whether the amount is disputed; a genuine dispute over the amount owed doesn't by itself make the claim unliquidated. Where the test is met, interest runs from when the claim arose, in practice the breach date.

Citation: Bickerstaff v. Prevost, 380 S.C. 613, 671 S.E.2d 660 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008)

Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/court-of-appeals/2008/4439.html

Accrual: property damage / tort claim

Likely the same measure-fixed-at-claim-inception test, but not squarely confirmed for property damage this pass

Bickerstaff v. Prevost was decided in a construction-contract dispute and doesn't expressly address whether its test extends to tort/property-damage claims. South Carolina's prejudgment interest doctrine isn't stated as contract-specific, so a property-damage claim with an ascertainable repair cost likely qualifies on the same reasoning, running from the date of loss, but this pass didn't locate a South Carolina case squarely applying the test to a property-damage tort claim.

Citation: Bickerstaff v. Prevost, 380 S.C. 613, 671 S.E.2d 660 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008)

Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/court-of-appeals/2008/4439.html

Treat this as reasoned extension rather than a confirmed, on-point property-damage holding; confirm with a case-law search or counsel before relying on it for a property-damage claim.

Actual Cash Value rule

Replacement cost minus depreciation (labor may be depreciated)

SC Supreme Court held insurers may depreciate labor costs embedded in materials when calculating ACV under a replacement-cost-minus-depreciation policy; a holding that presumes this is SC's underlying methodology. One industry reference page (theartofadjusting.com/acv-determination) instead states South Carolina 'uses the Broad Evidence Rule,' but cites no case or statute for that claim. Weighed against an actual state Supreme Court opinion, the citation below is the stronger finding, but both sources are named here so you can judge for yourself rather than take our word for it.

Citation: Butler v. The Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., 858 S.E.2d 407 (S.C. 2021)

Source: https://www.sccourts.org/media/opinions/advSheets/no162021.pdf

Conflicting source (uncited): theartofadjusting.com/acv-determination classifies SC as a 'broad evidence rule' state with no case/statute given. See detail above.

ACV statute or regulation

No South Carolina statute or regulation was found that statutorily defines the ACV calculation method or restricts labor depreciation.

South Carolina's Unfair Trade Practices Act, S.C. Code Ann. 38-59-10 to 38-59-50, and the corresponding claims regulations at S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 69-1 et seq. were reviewed for an ACV-defining provision comparable to Ohio's or Rhode Island's; none was found. South Carolina's rule on labor depreciation is case law: in Butler v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., 858 S.E.2d 407 (S.C. 2021), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that an insurer may depreciate the embedded labor component of a repair estimate when calculating ACV, reasoning that depreciating materials but not labor would be impractical. No subsequent legislation responding to or codifying that holding was identified. This is common-law precedent, not a statute, and it permits rather than restricts labor depreciation.

Citation: S.C. Code Ann. 38-59-10 to 38-59-50; S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 69-1 et seq. (reviewed; neither addresses property ACV or labor depreciation); Butler v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., 858 S.E.2d 407 (S.C. 2021) (case law, not statute)

Source: https://law.justia.com/codes/south-carolina/2005/69/69.html

The regulation text itself (only section headings) could not be fully retrieved, so the absence of an ACV provision in S.C. Code Regs. 69 is reported with slightly lower confidence than for states where full text was reviewed.

Recoverable depreciation holdback

No South Carolina statute sets a holdback release deadline. On the related labor-depreciation question, South Carolina permits depreciating labor when repair costs include embedded labor components.

No South Carolina statute or regulation specifically governing the timing or process for paying withheld recoverable depreciation was found. On the related scope question, the South Carolina Supreme Court held an insurer may depreciate the cost of labor in determining ACV when the estimated repair or replacement cost includes both materials and embedded labor components.

Citation: Butler v. The Travelers Home and Marine Ins. Co., No. 2020-001285 (S.C. May 12, 2021).

Source: https://www.hkr.law/survey-of-state-law-regarding-depreciation-of-labor-costs-in-determination-of-actual-cash-value/

RESEARCHED from scratch. No holdback-timing statute found; the labor-depreciation holding is from a comprehensive, dated (Aug. 2025) 50-state survey, not independently re-verified against the primary opinion in this pass.

“No damages for delay” clause enforceability

Generally valid, but described by South Carolina's own courts as a weak defense given four recognized exceptions

The South Carolina Supreme Court holds no-damages-for-delay clauses generally valid and enforceable, but recognizes four exceptions that substantially limit their practical use: the clause won't be enforced where the party invoking it is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, or bad faith; where the contractor's progress was interfered with by direct, active, or willful interference; where the delay becomes unreasonably long, amounting to an abandonment of the contract; or where the delay results from gross negligence, which the court equates with a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Citation: Williams Elec. Co. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 325 S.C. 129, 480 S.E.2d 447 (1997)

Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/sc-supreme-court/1442729.html

RESEARCHED from scratch. Williams Electric confirmed real, foundational, widely cited across jurisdictions. South Carolina recognizes exceptions for fraud/bad faith, active interference, unreasonable-delay-justifying-abandonment, and gross negligence -- but explicitly does NOT recognize the 'delay not contemplated by the parties' exception used in many other states.

Construction contract filing deadline

3 years for a contract action

South Carolina's general limitations period for an action upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied (excluding one under seal or a judgment/decree), is 3 years from accrual, covering an ordinary written construction-contract claim.

Citation: S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530

Source: https://law.justia.com/codes/south-carolina/title-15/chapter-3/section-15-3-530/

State unemployment insurance (SUTA)

New employer rate is a flat 1.0% for businesses with less than 12 months of liability. Experienced employers range from 0.06% to 5.46% by tax class. Taxable wage base is $14,000.

Confirmed directly against dew.sc.gov: 2026 marks South Carolina's largest UI tax cut by percentage since 2011, saving businesses in tax classes 2-19 an average of 34.7% versus 2025. Any employer with no UI benefit charges from July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2025 is placed in tax class 1 and pays the minimum 0.06%.

Citation: South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce (DEW).

Source: https://dew.sc.gov/news/2025-11/2026-tax-rate-cuts-press-release

Last checked: 2026-08-26

CORRECTED: the prior entry stated 1.060% as the new-employer rate. The actual 2026 rate, confirmed directly against DEW's own press release (and independently corroborated by two other sources citing the same announcement), is a flat 1.0%.

Workers' compensation rating

NCCI advisory state. South Carolina mandates adoption of NCCI-approved loss costs; employers purchase coverage from licensed private carriers regulated by the South Carolina Department of Insurance.

South Carolina is an NCCI state; the South Carolina Department of Insurance mandates adoption of NCCI-approved loss costs as the basis for filed workers' compensation rates. South Carolina is a competitive, not monopolistic, state, employers may purchase coverage from any licensed private insurer.

Citation: National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI); South Carolina Department of Insurance

Source: https://www.ncci.com/

Prevailing wage law

South Carolina has no state prevailing-wage law. Public construction contracts are not subject to a state-mandated prevailing wage requirement.

South Carolina has never enacted a state prevailing-wage law and is among the states the U.S. Department of Labor lists as having no such requirement for state or local public construction contracts. Only the federal Davis-Bacon Act applies, and only to contracts with federal funding.

Citation: U.S. Department of Labor, State Prevailing Wage Laws summary

Source: https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/prevailing-wages

OSHA plan

Full state plan, private + public sector

South Carolina operates a full OSHA-approved state plan (SC Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation) covering both private and public-sector employers.

Citation: 29 U.S.C. § 667; S.C. Code Title 41

Source: https://www.osha.gov/stateplans/sc

Weight of an OSHA violation in a negligence case

Now confirmed applied specifically to OSHA at the Court of Appeals level: South Carolina courts treat OSHA compliance/violation as a real, relevant category of evidence in ordinary negligence claims, though the state Supreme Court has not directly addressed this specific point.

Olson v. Faculty House of Carolina, Inc., 344 S.C. 194, 544 S.E.2d 38 (Ct. App. 2001): the plaintiff's negligence claim failed specifically because she "failed to present any evidence Faculty House violated ANSI, ADA, OSHA, or other standards or regulations regarding nonslip floors," confirming that had such evidence existed, it would have been relevant to the negligence analysis. Confirmed via the official South Carolina Judicial Department opinion text (sccourts.org).

Citation: Olson v. Faculty House of Carolina, Inc., 344 S.C. 194, 544 S.E.2d 38 (Ct. App. 2001).

Source: https://www.sccourts.org/media/opinions/HTMLFiles/COA/3289.htm

Court of Appeals level, not South Carolina Supreme Court; the entry's prior note about full high-court confirmation remaining open still holds, but this is now a real, on-point, officially-sourced citation rather than a general characterization.

Third-party contribution against the employer

South Carolina may extend protection to statutory employers; non-immune third parties are reached via premises conditions, retained control, active participation, negligent undertaking, product defects, or vehicles.

The source doesn't detail South Carolina's statutory-employer qualifying test beyond confirming it exists.

Citation: S.C. Code §§42-1-10 et seq.; Glass v. Dow Chemical Co., 325 S.C. 198 (1997).

Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1343570/glass-v-dow-chemical-co/

Source: attorney research manual (Construction Injury Law national volumes), self-marked "Draft; verify current law and citator status." Case citations are representative authorities from that manual, not independently re-verified against a citator by ClaimDuke. Confirmed real and directly on point (a construction facade-replacement injury case establishing the three-part statutory-employee test). Worth flagging: a more recent South Carolina Supreme Court case, Keene v. CNA Holdings, LLC (Aug. 2021), significantly narrowed this doctrine, abandoning the old three-part test from Glass in favor of a more business-oriented standard that increases the likelihood companies can be held liable in tort. Glass remains real and foundational, but Keene is the more current statement of South Carolina law and should be incorporated in a future content pass.

Injury-severity gate on contribution claims

General exclusivity under §§42-1-10 et seq., may extend to protect statutory employers: this source doesn't name a specific piercing exception.

S.C. Code §§42-1-10 et seq. generally makes compensation exclusive against the employer and may protect statutory employers. The manual doesn't identify a further piercing exception; confirm directly.

Citation: S.C. Code §§42-1-10 et seq.; Glass v. Dow Chemical Co., 325 S.C. 198 (1997).

Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1343570/glass-v-dow-chemical-co/

Source: attorney research manual (Construction Injury Law national volumes), self-marked "Draft; verify current law and citator status." Case citations are representative authorities from that manual, not independently re-verified against a citator by ClaimDuke.

Distinctive state doctrine

South Carolina significantly narrowed its 'statutory employee' exclusivity doctrine in a 2021 landmark decision -- Keene v. CNA Holdings -- shifting the test to focus on what the hiring company itself decided is part of its business, making it easier for contract/subcontractor workers to sue in tort rather than being limited to workers-comp.

Before 2021, South Carolina's statutory-employee doctrine barred contract workers from suing in tort if their work was an important, necessary, or previously-performed part of the hiring company's business. In Keene v. CNA Holdings, LLC, 870 S.E.2d 156 (S.C. 2021) -- arising from an asbestos-exposure death of a maintenance contractor at a fiber plant -- the South Carolina Supreme Court held that when an employer makes a legitimate business decision to outsource work (even work formerly done in-house), that work is no longer considered part of the employer's trade or business, so the exclusivity doctrine does not apply and the worker may sue in tort. This is directly relevant to construction: subcontractors performing work squarely within a general contractor's trade (e.g., framers for a general contractor building a building) generally remain statutory employees limited to workers-comp, but genuinely outsourced specialty work may no longer qualify.

Citation: Keene v. CNA Holdings, LLC, 870 S.E.2d 156 (S.C. 2021).

Source: https://www.maynardnexsen.com/publication-south-carolina-supreme-court-alters-statutory-employee

RESEARCHED from scratch (prior entry was blank/null). Confirmed real, landmark, and still being actively applied and discussed as recently as 2025-2026 sources -- a genuinely significant recent doctrinal shift, not a settled decades-old rule like most other states' exclusivity doctrines.