OSHA enforcement structure, how much weight an OSHA violation carries in a negligence case, and whether an injured worker's own employer can be pulled back in.
OSHA plan
IOSHA: full state plan, private + public sector
Indiana operates IOSHA (Indiana Occupational Safety and Health Administration), a full OSHA-approved state plan covering both private and public-sector employers.
Citation: 29 U.S.C. § 667; Ind. Code § 22-8-1.1
Source: https://www.osha.gov/stateplans/in
Weight of an OSHA violation in a negligence case
Confirmed evidence, not negligence per se: a direct Indiana Court of Appeals holding, reinforced by an Indiana Supreme Court case extending FELA-based reasoning to ordinary negligence claims
The Indiana Court of Appeals held directly: 'Violation of an administrative regulation can be considered evidence of negligence, though it is not evidence per se.' Separately, the Indiana Supreme Court, in a case originally decided under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, held that OSHA's savings clause (29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4)) precludes treating an OSHA violation as negligence per se; and a later Indiana Court of Appeals case extended that same rationale beyond the FELA context to ordinary common-law negligence claims, confirming the 'some evidence' classification applies generally in Indiana.
Citation: Beta Steel v. Rust, 830 N.E.2d 62, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Hebel v. Conrail, Inc., 475 N.E.2d 652, 657-58 (Ind. 1985); Blocher v. DeBartolo Properties Management, 760 N.E.2d 229, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/steel-v-rust-no-895793781
Third-party contribution against the employer
Indiana may extend protection to statutory employers and certain co-employees; non-immune third parties are reached via premises, retained control, negligent undertaking, defective products, or vehicles.
The source doesn't detail Indiana's statutory-employer qualifying test beyond confirming it exists alongside co-employee protection.
Citation: Ind. Code §§22-3-1 et seq.; GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397 (Ind. 2001).
Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/indiana/supreme-court/2001/03130101-rdr.html
Source: attorney research manual (Construction Injury Law national volumes), self-marked "Draft; verify current law and citator status." Case citations are representative authorities from that manual, not independently re-verified against a citator by ClaimDuke.
Injury-severity gate on contribution claims
General exclusivity under §§22-3-1 et seq., may protect statutory employers and certain co-employees: this source doesn't name a specific piercing exception.
Ind. Code §§22-3-1 et seq. generally makes compensation exclusive against the employer and may protect statutory employers and certain co-employees. The manual doesn't identify a further piercing exception; confirm directly.
Citation: Ind. Code §§22-3-1 et seq.; Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. 1992).
Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/indiana/supreme-court/1992/02s00-9203-cq-169-4.html
Source: attorney research manual (Construction Injury Law national volumes), self-marked "Draft; verify current law and citator status." Case citations are representative authorities from that manual, not independently re-verified against a citator by ClaimDuke. Confirmed real (601 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. 1992)), but the case addresses whether an employee can sue their employer's WORKERS COMP INSURANCE CARRIER for tortious conduct -- a narrower and different exception from general employer-immunity piercing. Related exclusivity doctrine, but not a direct match for this field's general employer-immunity-exception topic.
Distinctive state doctrine
Leased/staffing-employee exclusivity confirmed by a real 2018 appellate case. The separate 1911-era 'Employer Liability' chapter (IC 22-3-9) is a pre-modern-Act relic; its own text and the absence of any mention in standard modern exclusive-remedy summaries indicate it doesn't provide a live alternate route for an ordinary construction injury today.
In Walls v. Markley Enterprises, Inc., 18A-CT-266 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018), a worker assigned by a staffing agency was held to be a joint employee of both the staffing agency and the client company under IC 22-3-6-1(a), meaning her workers' comp claim against the staffing agency was her exclusive remedy against the client company too. This confirms Indiana's leased-employee exclusivity extension is real and directly relevant to construction sites using staffing agencies or leased labor. Separately, IC 22-3-9 (Chapter 9, 'Employer Liability') is a distinct, older statutory scheme dating to 1911, before Indiana's modern no-fault Workers' Compensation Act (IC 22-3-2 through 22-3-6) existed. Its own savings clause, IC 22-3-9-3, limits it to preserving liability 'under the common law or any other statute existing on March 2, 1911,' and it caps wrongful-death damages at a flat $10,000 under IC 22-3-9-6, an archaic figure no modern statute would set. Standard practitioner summaries of Indiana's current exclusive-remedy rule (the intentional-injury, failure-to-secure-coverage, independent-legal-relationship, and retaliatory-discharge exceptions) don't mention Chapter 9 at all. Taken together, this strongly indicates Chapter 9 is a vestigial pre-Act liability scheme rather than a live alternate route available against an employer already covered by the modern Act, which is the normal case for a construction employer.
Citation: Walls v. Markley Enterprises, Inc., 18A-CT-266 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018); IC 22-3-6-1(a); IC 22-3-9-1, 22-3-9-3, 22-3-9-6 (Employer Liability chapter).
Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/indiana/court-of-appeals/2018/18a-ct-266.html
The Walls case and IC 22-3-6-1(a) holding remain independently confirmed. The Chapter 9 conclusion is a well-supported inference from the statute's own text (its 1911 savings clause, its archaic damages cap) and its absence from modern secondary sources, not a single case squarely holding Chapter 9 superseded for Act-covered employers; no such case was found in this pass. Treat this as a strong, sourced inference, not case-law-confirmed fact.